Pleasure by Shapiro Lisa;

Pleasure by Shapiro Lisa;

Author:Shapiro, Lisa;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA - OSO
Published: 2018-07-27


That is, since pleasures and pains cannot be abstracted from sensible qualities, they are arguably reducible to them. In yet other passages, however, Berkeley simply lists pleasures alongside sensible qualities, as in NB 136, where he asks: “qu: wt can we see beside colours, wt can we feel beside, hard, soft cold warm pleasure pain.” This is ambiguous between either of the above views or, indeed, a slightly weaker one, on which Berkeley merely means to be claiming that pleasures, pains, and sensible qualities must admit of similar or parallel metaphysical analyses. The first question that I will address, then, is what this metaphysical analysis might be. Following this, I will consider some epistemological implications for Berkeley’s parallel accounts of sensible qualities and pleasures. I will explore Berkeley’s view that we can have knowledge of the existence and nature of physical objects via our sensible quality perceptions, and I will consider whether he might or does say the same with respect to pleasures.



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